- Ware, Lauren. The Moral Psychology of Fear, Editor (London: Rowman & Littlefield, in preparation).
Part of the series: The Moral Psychology of the Emotions.
Journal Articles & Book Chapters
- Archer, Alfred and Lauren Ware. “Beyond the Call of Beauty”, The Monist, Vol. 101, Issue 1 (2018).
ABSTRACT. A recognisable feature of our lives is that we make aesthetic demands of each other: we demand that people meet certain aesthetic standards and hold them accountable when they do not. These aesthetic demands are particularly prevalent in the realm of everyday aesthetics. We demand that people dress according to certain standards for certain jobs or social occasions. We demand that those we live with keep our homes in line with certain aesthetic standards (though as many couples and flatmates will recognise, these standards vary greatly). We demand that people refrain from playing certain music on certain occasions—like polka at a funeral. It is surprising then, that up to now the literature on aesthetic requirements has had little to say about the realm of everyday aesthetics. This paper will defend two claims. First, we will argue for the existence of aesthetic demands in the realm of everyday aesthetics and that these demands are not reducible to moral demands. Second, we will argue that we must recognise the limits of these demands in order to combat a prevalent and important form of gendered oppression. The concept of aesthetic supererogation offers a new structural framework to understand both the pernicious nature of this oppression and what may be done to mitigate it.
- Ware, Lauren. “The Emotion Turn in Philosophy”, invited for Analysis Reviews.
ABSTRACT. This article focuses on the most recent debates in the vibrant and emerging subfield of philosophy of emotion research. Given the dominance of 'cognitivist' theories of emotion in the philosophy, neurobiology, and cognitive science of emotion, we have witnessed a move away from attempts to pit reason and emotion against each other. This move, however, has opened the door to a host of thorny challenges for how we think about our affective relationship with the world, with concepts, and with other minds.
- Ware, Lauren. “Who's Afraid of a Citizens' Income?”, invited for Politics and Governance (Special Issue on Emotions in Politics and International Relations, eds. Alex Prior and Yuri van Hoef).
ABSTRACT. Arguments in support of a Citizens' Income often focus on the freedom from fear, anxiety, and uncertainty such an initiative would offer. Arguments against a Citizens' Income often assert that without fear, individuals would not be motivated to work. These arguments, however, are made without consideration of the empirical or theoretical research we have on fear. In this paper, I draw on the philosophy and cognitive science of fear to evaluate whether either argument can deliver what its proponents want.
- Ware, Lauren and Lee Whittington. “Perceptions of Risk, Fear, and Community Suffering”, invited chapter in Waiting for the End of the World: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Risk, ed. Chris Gerrard (Oxford: Oxbow Books).
ABSTRACT. In 1258, the largest volcanic eruption of the past 7000 years affected the whole continent of Europe. How did potential hazards become disasters, and how did societies perceive these events? In this chapter, we draw on the roll-call of disasters that struck Medieval European societies to frame an evaluation of how fear can be seen to impact risk assessment when the event of that risk is the catastrophic suffering of an entire community.
- Ware, Lauren. “Is Fear the Mind-Killer?”, introduction to The Moral Psychology of Fear (London: Rowman & Littlefield).
ABSTRACT. A critical introduction to the philosophy, cognitive science, and moral psychology of fear.
- Archer, Alfred and Lauren Ware. (2017) “Aesthetic Supererogation”, Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 54: 102-116.
ABSTRACT. Many aestheticians and ethicists are interested in the similarities and connections between aesthetics and ethics (Nussbaum 1990; Foot 2002; Gaut 2007). One way in which some have suggested the two domains are different is that in ethics there exist obligations while in aesthetics there do not (Hampshire 1954). However, Marcia Muelder Eaton has argued that there is good reason to think that aesthetic obligations do exist (Eaton 2008). We will explore the nature of these obligations by asking whether acts of aesthetic supererogation (acts that go beyond the call of our aesthetic obligations) are possible. In this paper, we defend the thesis that there is good reason to think such acts exist.
- Ware, Lauren. (2016) “Emotions in the Evaluation of Legal Risk”, invited chapter in Law and Emotion, eds. Hilge Landweer and Dirk Koppelberg (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag), 249-277. Also in German as Recht und Emotion I: Verkannte Zusammenhänge.
ABSTRACT. The risks taken into account in legal decision-making are, often, matters of life and death, but the way we think about risk is flawed. This is a problem. The dominant account of how emotions are involved in risky decision-making follows the standard probabilistic account of risk. If we entertain a modal account of risk, however, this changes the way in which a host of legal actors—members of the jury, judges, defendants, lawyers, legislators, regulators, and police—ought to think about how emotions impact risk evaluation. In this chapter, I examine what taking a modal account of risk would mean for the way we understand emotions in the evaluation of legal risk: specifically, the risk of wrongful conviction
- Ware, Lauren. (2015) “Erotic Virtue”, Res Philosophica, Vol. 92, Issue 4: 915-935.
ABSTRACT. This paper defends an account of how erotic love works to develop virtue. It is argued that love drives moral development by holding the creation of virtue in the individual as the emotion’s intentional object. After analyzing the distinction between passive and active accounts of the object of love, this paper demonstrates that a Platonic virtue-ethical understanding of erotic love—far from being consumed with ascetic contemplation—offers a positive treatment of emotion’s role in the attainment and social practice of virtue.
- Ware, Lauren. (2014) “What Good is Love?”, Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis, Vol. 34, Issue 2: 57-73.
ABSTRACT. The role of emotions in mental life is the subject of longstanding controversy, spanning ethics, moral psychology, and educational theory. This paper defends an account of love’s cognitive power. My starting point is Plato’s dialogue, the Symposium, in which we find the surprising claim that love aims at engendering moral virtue. I argue that this understanding affords love a crucial place in educational curricula, as engaging the emotions can motivate both cognitive achievement and moral development. I first outline the state of the challenge between dominant rival theories regarding emotions in learning. Next, I demonstrate how Platonic virtue ethics offers the most tenable prospect for an education of reason and emotion. Third, I sketch three practical ways educators might constructively engage emotions in the classroom. I conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to motivate the creative and lateral thinking which leads to moral development.
- Ware, Lauren. (2014) “The Emotional and Intellectual Virtue of Faith”, invited for the 25th anniversary edition of InterFaith Matters.
Papers Under Review & In Preparation
- “Plato’s Bond of Love”
- “The Emotion Turn in Legal Philosophy”
- “The Pain Factory”
- “In Defence of Hate” (with Lee John Whittington)
- “Affective Imagination in Recidivism Risk Assessment”
- “Stereotype Threat and Gendered Material in Undergraduate Philosophy Education”
- “On Bullshit Exams”